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AN OVERVIEW OF THE HAITIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 
This is the eleventh in a series of documents concerning Haiti to be made 
available through the University of Kansas Institute of Haitian Studies. The 
present Paper is the result of an original investigation conducted by Sara 
Lechtenberg involving no less than eighteen personal interviews with Haitian 
judges and lawyers, as well as with several foreign observers highly 
knowledgeable concerning the Haitian justice system, in addition to a number 
of written sources. She previously studied Journalism and Haitian Studies as an 
undergraduate at the University of Kansas, and subsequently was graduated from 
the University of Kansas School of Law. Ms. Lechtenberg has made in all 
seven trips to Haiti and has recently served as a consultant for the United States 
Agency for International Development in Haiti (USAID/Haiti) concerning the 
administration of justice. She was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to Haiti for 
1996-97 in order to study Haiti's criminal justice system. 
We believe the present study constitutes a valuable summary of the justice 
system in Haiti at the present time. The presence of the United Nations Mission 
in Haiti (UNMIH) affords that nation at least a temporary respite from organized 
armed internal political strife, during which period it is hoped that basic 
structural reforms can be carried out in its administration of justice helping to 
ensure future stability in both the civic and political sectors. Without rule by 
law, no nation can long prosper. 
Bryant Freeman 
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October 15, 1994 marked the return of Haiti's first democratically elected president, 
ending three years of military dictatorship. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, elected in 1990 by a 67 
percent majority, preaches a message of reconciliation. Not far from the National Palace hang 
banners which read "Respect Life," and the building that once served as military headquarters 
now houses the newly created Ministry of Women's Affairs. During the days following 
Aristide's return, the talk on the radio and in the market is of "democracy" and "justice." But 
democracy and justice are not just the current topics of conversation in Port-au-Prince; foreign 
nations and non-governmental organizations have pledged nearly a billion dollars to Haiti to 
help build a stable democracy. 
In an August 1994 statement, the Aristide government stressed the importance of 
developing a strong justice sector: 
[T]he second cornerstone for both a peaceful democratic society and a 
prosperous economy is represented by the establishment of an independent 
Judiciary that is able to fairly arbitrate conflicts among the members of society, 
and provide adequate protection for private sector activity, property rights and 
fundamental human rights.1 
As Haiti moves from military dictatorship to democracy, many people are looking 
closely at the problems that have plagued the Haitian justice sector. This paper will provide 
a brief sketch of both the legitimate Haitian justice system and the (injustice system that has 
ruled Haiti in the past. After providing this background, the problems that currently plague 
the Haitian justice sector will be evaluated. This evaluation is drawn from interviews 
conducted in January 1995 with members of the Haitian legal community, human rights 
observers, and others directly involved in the justice sector. In conclusion, a personal 
perspective on the future of the Haitian justice sector will be presented. 
I. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. Written Laws 
In 1492 Christopher Columbus claimed Haiti for the Spanish, but the dominant 
influence on the legal development of Haiti came only later, from the French. In the 1697 
Treaty of Ryswick, Spain officially recognized France's right to what is today Haiti.2 During 
the French colonial period, "Le Code Noir" served as the law of Haiti.3 
During the colonial era, the French used African slave labor to produce sugar, cotton, 
indigo and other cash crops for Europe. After close to 300 years of exploitation, slaves 
rebelled against the French colonists, and Haiti won its independence in 1804. Between 1804 
and 1825, chaos dominated the Haitian justice sector. During this period, Haiti's presidents 
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issued diverse laws called "Imperial Ordinances," but many people found these regulations 
confusing.4 In response to this confusion, the Haitian Government created a nine-member 
commission to prepare a civil code following the Constitution of 1816. Two years later, the 
nine-member commission presented a draft which was essentially a replica of France's 
Napoleonic Code. 
French jurists wrote the French Civil Code promulgated by Napoleon in 1804. The 
French code reflected European law prior to 1804, but also addressed the newer ideology of 
the "liberal" revolution of the French.5 These codes were written with the Utopian idea that 
the average citizen could read and understand the law, and the Civil Code could sit next to the 
family Bible in every home to provide guidance on legal matters.6 
Just as the French Civil Code is divided into 35 "laws," the Haitian Civil Code has 35 
corresponding "titles." Some of the articles present in the French Civil Code did not appear 
in the Haitian Civil Code, thus reducing the initial number of articles from 2281 to 2047.7 
Soon after adopting the French Civil Code, Haiti adopted the French Commercial, 
Criminal, and Procedural Codes. Only slight modifications were made to the French Codes 
prior to passage, and these Codes still serve as the backbone of the Haitian legal system.8 New 
legislation is published in the Haitian government's official gazette, Le Moniteur, and through 
the process of codification, new laws are integrated into the codes.9 
In the civil law tradition, legal analysis is based on a hierarchy of legislation, 
regulations, and customs, with constitutional law assuming importance only recently. The 
primary source of law is legislation, not judge-made law. Haitian lawyers and judges rely on 
the writings of French legal scholars and court decisions to aid in the interpretation of code 
provisions. 
Haiti has had no less than twenty constitutions since winning independence from France 
in 1804. According to one source, the large number of constitutions is due to the fact that, 
rather than using amendments as seen in the United States Constitution, Haitian leaders 
proclaim a new constitution each time a change is made.1 0 Other civil law countries with 
more stable political environments have also had more than one constitution; for example, 
France has had nine constitutions since 1798, with its latest constitution serving only since 
1958. 
In many of Haiti's constitutions, the new president grants himself the right to rule for 
life as well as the right to name a successor. Haiti's first constitution, promulgated in 1801 
by Toussaint Louverture, contains these same two provisions,11 and well over a century later 
the four constitutions promulgated by François Duvalier continued to have this same 
authoritarian element.12 
The French influenced the early development of Haitian law, but the United States 
directly impacted Haitian constitutional law during its 1915 to 1934 Occupation. The US 
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influenced the 1918 and 1932 Constitutions in many ways. First, those written during the U.S. 
Occupation were the first to allow foreigners the right to own land in Haiti. Second, these 
constitutions had provisions that validated the acts of the American authorities during the 
Occupation. Additionally, the presidential term was reduced from seven to four years.13 
The current constitution, written shortly after the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier, was 
approved by public referendum in 1987, suspended in 1988 by General Henri Namphy, and 
reinstated in 1989.14 Drafters of the 1987 Constitution looked to earlier Haitian Constitutions, 
foreign constitutions, the abuses of the Duvalier era, as well as incorporating personal 
ideologies.15 
The 1987 Constitution departs from the authoritarian trend of past constitutions and 
focuses instead on individual liberty. It guarantees the right to life, freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly, and freedom of religion. Additionally, Number 20 abolishes the death penalty. 
One example of the focus on individual rights is Number 24-3(5). This provision states: 
"Chak moun reskonsab tèt yo. Yo pa gen dwa arete pèsonn moun nan plas yon lot moun." 
("Responsibility is personal. No one can be arrested in place of another.") It had been 
common for police to arrest a friend or relative instead of the accused when the person 
officially charged could not be found, and the 1987 Constitution seeks to remedy this injustice. 
The 1987 Constitution mixes realism and optimism. For example, Number 32-2 states: 
"Premye travay Leta, ak moun ki alatèt chak zôn peyi a, se je yon jan pou tout moun rive al 
lekôl Se sèl jan yo va kapab mete peyi a sou wout pwogrè vre." ("The first responsibility of 
the State, with community leaders, is to make it possible for every person to go to school. Only 
in this manner is it possible to put the country on the true road to progress.") In this provision, 
and in many others like it, the drafters acknowledge the massive problems that Haiti must 
overcome, and constitutionally require the State to serve as a force of change, rather than as 
a force of repression. 
According to some writers, the provision in the 1987 Constitution which speaks most 
clearly of the abuses of the Duvalier regime is Article 291. This provision establishes that for 
ten years following the publication of the constitution, no person previously affiliated with the 
Duvalier regime may be a candidate for public office. According to Haitian civil rights activist 
Jean-Claude Bajeux, article 291 made the 1987 Constitution very popular with the majority of 
Haitians who "went into the streets shouting their joy and approval" once the article was read 
over the radio. 1 6 
The right to a jury trial in criminal and civil cases is present in early Haitian 
Constitutions, but this right has not been consistently maintained in later constitutions. The 
1843 Constitution granted the accused the right to a jury trial for all offenses, whereas the 1928 
Constitution establishes that a jury trial is granted only "for such criminal cases as the law will 
determine."17 Today, Criminal Courts empanel a jury only for cases involving violence.1* 
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Of particular impact on the Haitian legal system is Number 276-2. This provision 
establishes that all ratified international treaties are incorporated into Haitian law and supersede 
any conflicting domestic legislation. Haiti is party to many international human rights and 
trade treaties and these covenants take precedence over domestic law.1 9 
B. Court Structure 
The Law of 1985 divides the Haitian Court system into 15 districts. The justices of the 
peace sit at the lower level-of the judicial hierarchy and have jurisdiction over both civil 
matters and minor criminal offenses. The primary responsibility of the justice of the peace is 
to reconcile disputing parties, and their decisions may be appealed to the trial court level 
The justice of the peace refers more serious civil and criminal offenses to the Office of 
the Public Prosecutor. The duty to investigate serious crimes is handled jointly by the Office 
of the Public Prosecutor and the Investigating Judge. 
In the common law tradition of England and the United States, there is no Investigating 
Judge. In civil law countries, judges are responsible for investigation and adjudication. This 
joint responsibility to investigate is seen in the French system where police, prosecutor, and 
the judicial official are charged with investigative responsibilities. 
Once the Public Prosecutor and the Investigating Judge decide to pursue criminal 
sanctions, the severity of the crime determines which court will try the case. The Correctional 
Courts handle felonies punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment, and the Criminal 
Courts try cases in which conviction may result in life imprisonment 
The four Courts of Appeal hear cases from the lower courts. The Supreme Court, the 
Cour de Cassation, is the court of last resort and hears only cases appealed from the lower 
courts. Similar to the United States Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation does not retry cases 
appealed from the lower courts, but rather reviews the lower court's decision and rules on the 
constitutionality of laws. 2 0 If the Cour de Cassation finds an irregularity with the lower court 
ruling, the justices remand the case for further adjudication. 
C. (In)justice System 
On paper, Haiti has clear rules governing which court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a 
claim and which law to apply. In reality, written law has not been followed. 
The highest law has been the law of men, rather than the law of the Constitution. 
According to one writer, 
Haitians have lived for the past 200 years in a state of non-law under a "just-us" 
or injustice system where only a limited few receive benefits and the rest who 
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resort to the judicial system are subject to its haphazard operation and/or 
corruption.21 
Other sources call the (injustice system the "Gwo NègM or "Big Man" system.22 The 
most powerful person in the community, the "Gwo Nèg," has dominated all aspects of life and 
what this person said always overruled any written law. The position of "Gwo Nèg" has varied 
with the change in ruling political parties, but typically a military official, a member of a 
paramilitary organization, a member of the executive branch, or a wealthy individual has filled 
the "Gwo Nèg" position. 
The section chief, similar to a county sheriff in the United States, served as "Gwo Nèg" 
during the Duvalier years. One grassroots group, Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen, claims that 
under the section chief system, a farmer living in rural Haiti in the 1990s enjoys no more 
freedom than did his slave ancestors in the 1790s. Under the "Gwo Nèg" system, section 
chiefs commonly forced peasants to work for free, and anyone who challenged the power of 
the section chief was silenced through torture or death.23 
One member of the Haitian judiciary, a justice of the peace, gives the following 
description of the power of the section chief: 
The section chief and his assistants establish their own administration; 
they arrest and try people themselves and do not involve the justice of the peace 
or the civil court system at all... The justice of the peace does not know what 
is going on in the hills.2 4 
Another person who filled the "Gwo Nèg" position during the Duvalier era was the 
local "Volunteer For National Security" chief — better known as the local head Tonton 
Macoute. His power eclipsed the judicial authority of the local magistrate, and by swearing 
allegiance to the Duvalier regime, he had the power to arrest, try, and execute.25 
After Duvalier fell in 1986, military domination of the justice sector continued. Some 
leaders attempted to limit the "Gwo Nèg" system but were largely unsuccessful.26 
Under the Aristide government the "Gwo Nèg" injustice system continued. During the 
eight months prior to the 1991 coup, a local Aristide supporter or an appointee from the 
Ministry of Interior served as "Gwo Nèg" in the community.27 
Sources disagree as to how effective Aristide was in developing a strong justice sector 
in the eight months he served as president prior to the September 1991 coup. Supporters claim 
he worked to create an environment in which the rule of law would prevail over the "Gwo 
Nèg" injustice system for the first time. Pro-Aristide groups point to the dissolution of the 
section chief position, the arrest of leaders of crime rings, anti-corruption campaigns in 
government, and attempts to control the drug trade as significant strides toward the 
establishment of a free and fair justice sector.2* 
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Others claim Aristide weakened the rule of law by encouraging crowds to seek justice 
in the streets rather than justice in the courts. Critics point to several of Aristide's speeches 
and say he encouraged the masses to usurp the judicial process. Human rights organizations, 
many of which are traditionally supportive of Aristide, say he should have spoken out against 
a system based on vengeance and mob violence.29 
Shortly after the September 1991 coup in which Aristide was overthrown, the military 
regime revived the section chief position. Amnesty International found that repression in the 
countryside had increased with the reinstatement of the section chiefs.30 The section chief 
or an ally.of the.military served as "Gwo Nèg" during the three years that Aristide was in 
exile. 
In the summer of 1993 allies of the military regime formed the paramilitary organization 
called Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès d'Haïti (FRAPH). FRAPH members say their 
organization was a legitimate political party, but human rights organizations and embassy 
sources document that FRAPH served as a front for the military.31 
Although Aristide returned to power in Haiti, the transition to a system based on written 
law was not automatic. According to the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the wGwo Nèg" justice system continues. Power is not evenly distributed in the 
justice sector and currently the prosecutors—members of the legitimate justice sector-hold the 
position of "Gwo Nèg." 3 2 
These prosecutors are able to dominate the justice system because they have the power 
to decide which cases warrant trial. USAID points out that prosecutors frequently pursue 
merit less claims against enemies and avoid pursuing politically sensitive cases.33 
Members of the Haitian legal community believe that the transition from the "Gwo Nèg" 
system to a modem justice system will be difficult According to Port-au-Prince attorney 
Patrick Woolley, "Haiti is currently operating under what is legitimate rather than what is 
legal." Woolley contends that Haiti is not following the strict letter of the Constitution; instead 
there is an attempt to follow the spirit of the law.3 4 
William O'Neill, Senior Policy Advocate for the National Coalition For Haitian 
Refugees, says this "extra-legal" transition period is required in order to move from a non-law 
system to one in which written laws will govern.35 
H. PROBLEMS WITH THE HAITIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Dèyè Men, Gen Man 
(Literal Translation: Behind mountains, there are mountains. 
Cultural Significance: Behind one problem lies another problem.) 
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This Haitian proverb accurately describes the status of the Haitian justice sector. At 
first glance, an observer sees the major obstacles, but upon closer inspection, additional 
problems come into focus. 
The following pages present a look at some of the principal problems concerning the 
Haitian justice sector. This is by no means a comprehensive, scientific evaluation of the 
problems, but rather presents the results of three weeks of informal interviews with members 
of the Haitian legal community. In order to gain a wide range of perspectives, both 
conservative and liberal members of the Haitian justice sector were consulted, along with a 
broad spectrum of human rights organizations. The intention has been to present this 
information in an objective maimer, and personal views will be reserved for the conclusion. 
A. Weapons 
"Melt the weapons and turn them into tools, please." 
(A member of a Haitian women's cooperative)36 
Many sources believe the high level of weapons among former military and paramilitary 
organizations blocks the development of a strong justice sector. Necker Dessables, Executive 
Secretary for the Justice and Peace Commission, says the justice sector continues to be held 
ransom. 
In 1993 and 1994 people didn't want to make arrests because of pressure from 
the military. Now judges don't want to pursue cases because of the same 
pressure — there is no security. Judges say that they don't have the authority or 
the paperwork to arrest people, but this is just an excuse to mask their fear of 
retribution from those who are armed. The fear is still there.37 
Although Aristide has abolished the military, there are still many weapons in Haiti. 
Members of the Haitian military kept their firearms when they left their positions and 
approximately two hundred thousand guns are held by the former military and the still active 
paramilitary organizations.31 
The Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean reports that people in 
the countryside continue to be attacked, terrorized, and killed by paramilitary attachés and 
Haitian military even after Aristide's return.39 
Yves Denize, a New York attorney who visited Haiti on behalf of the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, sees the high level of weapons among former military and 
paramilitary organizations as a major barrier. According to Denize, former members of the 
military and paramilitary forces are "fully armed and ready to go into action once the 
Multinational Force (MNF) is gone."40 
Many human rights organizations warn that without an aggressive disarmament 
campaign, the upcoming elections for the Haitian legislature will be dangerous. Elections are 
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scheduled to be held in June, but according to a Pax Christi human rights observer who visited 
Haiti in December, many people fear the elections will be violent.41 
The Commission for Justice and Peace also believes that a safe and fair election will 
not be possible if there is no disarmament Necker Dessables points to the 1987 elections 
which were canceled after armed military and paramilitary organizations killed voters at polling 
stations. Dessables explains, "We have the 1987 elections as a souvenir... Only those with 
guns will vote [in the upcoming elections] and this will be a de facto coup. A coup in the 
ballot box." 4 2 
Pax Christi observers met with Colin Granderson, the head of the OAS-UN Observer 
Mission, who stated that the US and MNF have effectively stopped searching for arms.4 3 
One barrier to an aggressive disarmament campaign is the 1987 Constitution. Numbers 
268-1 through 268-3 address the right to bear arms. The 1987 Constitution provides that 
citizens have the right to use a gun in self-defense in the home and may carry a gun with the 
permission of the chief of police.4 4 
The Lawyers Committee For Human Rights reports several possible reasons for the lack 
of an aggressive disarmament campaign. In addition to the legal constraints of the 1987 
Constitution, an active program would require additional work for the MNF, and there would 
be an increased risk of casualties. Also, many of the MNF do not see the need for an active 
disarmament campaign; one US military official explained that the crime levels in Haiti do not 
merit an aggressive disarmament campaign. To this individual, and to a great number of the 
US military, disarmament programs are conducted in response to crime problems. Currently, 
the US forces either do not see a need for a disarmament campaign because they do not see 
a high probability for a resurgence in human rights abuses, or they choose not to actively 
disarm because of political ramifications.45 According to General Joseph W. Kinzer, 
commander of United Nations Forces in Haiti, the UN mandate does not authorize an active 
disarmament program. 
Several sources criticize the disarmament campaign the MNF ran during the early days 
of the occupation and say the practice of using the Haitian Armed Forces in the disarmament 
process was unwise. Human rights organizations question whether a disarmament campaign 
can be effective if those who disarm are allied with those who are being disarmed. The MNF 
and the Haitian Armed Forces conducted all weapon searches jointly and the Haitian Armed 
Forces were informed of the time and place for searches. When former military members were 
scheduled to be searched, the current Haitian military were able to warn former colleagues of 
the impending search.4 6 
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B. Judges 
"Cawed, corrupted and often incompetent" 
(Lawyers Committee description of the Haitian Judiciary) 
Regardless of political affiliation, regardless of wealth, and regardless of power, the 
subject that every member of the legal community agreed upon was the need to develop a 
strong core of judges. 
Eva Tabuteau, the former director general of the Ministry of Justice, spoke of the need 
for an improved judiciary shortly after Aristide's return. MA11 judges will be fired. There are 
500 now and we have to get rid of them. We have to find judges we trust."47 
In a January 1995 meeting, Ms. Tabuteau revised her statement and said that not all of 
the judges needed to be fired, but only a large proportion. Tabuteau said, "Haiti needs honest, 
competent judges so people will have confidence in the system... If you know you are going 
to be judged, you will reflect before you do something." 
1. Inadequate Nomination and Recruitment Procedure 
Historically the nomination and recruitment process for the Haitian judiciary has been 
corrupt. The 1987 Constitution establishes that judges are to be nominated by the communal 
assemblies and then the president makes the final determination from this candidate list. In 
reality, this nomination process has not been followed. 
As of December 1994, judges were still not being appointed according to the 
Constitution. According to several sources, it would take a minimum of six months for the 
Communal Assemblies to meet and present the president with candidates for the open positions 
on the bench. The executive branch did not follow the constitutionally mandated nomination 
process, but rather directly named judges to the Supreme Court 
In the past, the prerequisites for becoming a judge were money and political connections 
rather than legal scholarship or courtroom experience. Some sources contend that judges have 
been able to buy their positions on the bench. The practice of purchasing a judgeship is not 
foreign to the civil law tradition. According to one comparative law scholar, prior to 1798, 
French judgeships were regarded as property which could be purchased and kept in the 
family.4* It is not a far leap to say that Haitian judges have been able to purchase their 
positions on the bench, but typically this right to serve on the bench does not descend to one's 
survivors. 
In the book Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
provides a statement by a Haitian lawyer summarizing the inadequate judicial recruitment 
process: 
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Because there is no system of recruiting, whoever (the military) recommends... 
is accepted and the military, whoever they are, will have power. The guy who 
wants to become a judge might as well have the support of the military officer 
in order to get there, and then after he gets there, he cannot be tough with that 
officer who, in some instances, is also a police officer.49 
In the December 1994 report, the Lawyers Committee stresses that the inadequate 
recruitment process for judges is a key issue that needs to be addressed. According to the 
Lawyers Committee, the judges and attorneys unanimously agreed that long-term improvements 
in the Haitian judiciary would be achieved only if screening regimens are established to weed 
out unqualified judicial candidates.50 
2 . Judicial Corruption 
The Court is a boutique. A judge is a person who sells justice and the person who 
gives the most money wins the case. 
(Necker Dessables, Justice and Peace Commission) 
In that the judicial nomination process is often corrupt, it is not surprising that this 
corruption is carried over onto the judges' work on the bench. Judicial corruption takes many 
different forms, but it is typically motivated by money and politics. 
One extreme example of judicial corruption took place after the fall of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier. In US and French courts, legal proceedings to recover stolen money were 
commenced against some of the Haitian elite loyal to the Duvaliers.51 Two Haitian judges and 
two law clerks forged documents that resulted in the US and French courts dismissing the 
charges.52 When the cases were dismissed, the assets of the Haitian elite were released, and 
none of the money that the elite allegedly stole was ever returned. The judges who forged the 
documents were fired from their positions, but the Haitian government did not charge them 
with any criminal offense.53 
The Lawyers Committee links judicial corruption to an increase in violence. The 
December 1994 report highlights how some judges will accept bribes from both the plaintiff 
and the defendant in a land dispute, telling both parties that they have legal title to the 
property. Later, when both parties seek to enforce what they believe to be their legal right to 
the land, there is an increased risk of violence.54 
Many of the attorneys said that the low pay forjudges is directly related to the problem 
of corruption. In Port-au-Prince, the lowest level of the judiciary receive the equivalent of 
$450 US dollars a month while the highest level are paid approximately $1,500 a month. 
According to one source, a driver at the US embassy makes a higher salary than does a justice 
of the peace. Although the 1987 Constitution prohibits judges from having jobs other than 
teaching, the low pay forces many judges to take other paid positions.55 
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3. Unqualified Judges 
According to Rigauld Duplan, President of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association, the low 
pay for judges not only leads to corruption, but also makes it difficult to find good candidates 
to serve on the bench. Because attorneys can earn more money in the private sector, becoming 
a judge is not an appealing prospect. Justices of the peace are required to have law degrees, 
but many outside of Port-au-Prince have no formal legal training.56 
As evidence of an unqualified judiciary, the former president of the Port-au-Prince Bar 
Association points to the fact that many judges do not conduct independent research. Gary 
Lissade states that many judges rely on the research of the attorneys and never bother to 
investigate the law. 5 7 
The lack of independent judicial research may be attributed to laziness, or to the fact 
that most judges do not have access to legal texts. Unlike American judges, most Haitian 
judges do not have a private library. If a judge questions a point of law, he must go to a 
private library or to the Bar Association library to find the legal text. 
4. Inadequate Judicial Education Programs 
Article 176 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the establishment of a school forjudges. 
The Haitian government has not established such an institution, but all sectors of the legal 
community are calling for a judicial training program.58 
USAID has developed a short-term judge training program with the help of the National 
Center for State Courts and the Department of Justice. In this short-term program, the lower-
level judges spent five days learning criminal law, criminal procedure, and investigation 
techniques. USAID plans to run this program in Port-au-Prince for three weeks before 
implementing it in the provincial towns for an additional five weeks.59 
Critics of the USAID judge training program say a five-day "crash course" is more 
symbolic than substantive. Other critics contend that a judge training program should originate 
from the Port-au-Prince Bar Association and not from a United States Agency.60 
In response to criticism, USAID emphasizes that this short-term judge training seminar 
will lay the foundation for a long-term judge training program as well as for other projects 
currently being developed to strengthen the Haitian judiciary. 
5. Low Respect for Judges 
In one session observing a justice of the peace holding court at the National Penitentiary 
in Port-au-Prince, the lack of respect for the judiciary was readily apparent Defendants 
screamed at the judge, refused to participate in the proceeding, and the court clerk constantly 
threatened to leave. The lack of respect for the judge was abundantly clear from this setting. 
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It is important to note that there are differences between the role of judge in the 
Common law tradition of the United States and the judicial function in the civil law tradition 
of France and Haiti. First, in the French civil law tradition, the judicial branch evolved in a 
manner in which judges were not given a great deal of power. Prior to the French Revolution, 
judges were distrusted and sometimes corrupt. According to comparative law scholar John 
Merryman, this distrust of the French judiciary led to a limited role for judges in the legal 
process.61 
Judges in the Common law tradition of England and the United States have been 
afforded a greater degree of respect, due in part to the fact that judges in these countries were 
chosen because of their legal ability. Edward I chose England's judges from the leaders of the 
Bar, whereas French judges were chosen from the civil service.62 
In addition to the different historical evolution of the judiciary in the civil law tradition, 
the process by which an individual becomes a judge is different. In the common law tradition, 
an individual becomes a judge after many years of working in the justice sector, and the public 
considers a judge to be something of a patriarch. In the orthodox civil law tradition, a law 
student attends a judge training program directly after law school to become a member of the 
judiciary, and consequently the public considers a judge to be a civil servant 
Historically, no judge training school has existed for law students in Haiti. According 
to one source, judges learn their work on the job and do not even receive training by working 
with an experienced judge. 6 3 
Although the civil law tradition does not afford judges the same level of respect as does 
the common law tradition, the majority of sources said there needs to be some improvement 
in the quality of Haitian judges as well as a greater level of respect accorded the Haitian 
judiciary in order to improve the Haitian justice system. 
6. Ineffective Disciplinary Council 
Several attorneys believe the Haitian judiciary will not improve unless an effective 
disciplinary body is developed. The Conseil de Discipline de la Magistrature is charged with 
weeding out corrupt and inefficient judges, but this disciplinary body is composed of other 
judges. Typically the judges who serve on the disciplinary council are unwilling to speak out 
against a colleague. This system of self-review helps maintain a body of sub-standard 
magistrates. 
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C. Lawyers 
"Lawyers are seen as robbers and thieves/' 
(Law Professor Elie Meus) 
In many countries, lawyers are not afforded the highest level of respect, but the lack of 
respect for lawyers in Haiti is particularly acute. The image problem may be due in part to 
the fact that many of the best attorneys have left Haiti because of the political instability.64 
According to William O'Neill, this "brain drain" has left the less talented members of the legal 
conmaunity--"mainly flunkies, lackies and those who bought their law degrees" to serve as 
attorneys.65 
Many of the Haitian attorneys who have fought for a strong justice system have paid 
the price with their lives. Perhaps the most striking example of the risks involved in being an 
outspoken attorney is the October 1993 assassination of Justice Minister Guy Malary. 
In civil law tradition, lawyers are generally not afforded the same level of respect found 
in the common law tradition. In writing the civil law code of France, drafters hoped to make 
the law clear enough that ordinary citizens could understand the law and would not need the 
services of a lawyer in court 6 6 
D. Modern Legal System Misunderstood and Mistrusted 
With an illiteracy rate of 85 percent, many people are unable to understand the value 
of a modern justice system. According to Uranie Orival Nadar, a Justice of the Peace in Port-
au-Prince, "People don't go to school, they don't understand law, they can't understand 
anything in the court system."67 
Several lawyers explained that many people do not draw a distinction between the crime 
of the defendant and the role of the lawyer. When the lawyer agrees to represent a criminal 
defendant, in many people's eyes, the lawyer is also committing a crime. According to 
Gervais Charles, a lawyer in Port-au-Prince, the physical risks involved with being a defense 
attorney are real. "If I give a criminal defendant representation, I will be seen as an 
accomplice." The president of the legal aid society L'Amicale des Juristes echoed the same 
belief. "Other people who are against my client are against me too. They wait for you outside 
the courthouse." 
The general public has little trust in the court process. Many times when the general 
public does not trust that a court proceeding will result in the outcome they desire, crowds will 
gather outside the courthouse and will interfere with the judge, jury, and legal counsel. 
Sometimes crowds will block lawyers from entering the courthouse and the judge will enter 
a default ruling against the side whose lawyer is absent According to Rigauld Duplan, public 
strikes outside the courthouses intimidate every person involved and make a fair trial 
impossible.6* 
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Many lawyers in Port-au-Prince believe that in order to develop an effective justice 
system, there needs to be an overall improvement in the education system in Haiti. Without 
greater access to education, it will be difficult for the general public to understand the value 
of a modern justice sector. 
According to law professor Elie Meus, respect for written law in Haiti is low. Meus 
says, "I would like for everyone to have respect for the law. We don't have that yet, but we 
will fight for i t" 
E. Justice System Inaccessible 
According to René Julien, President of L'Amicale des Juristes, one of the biggest 
problems with the justice sector is that it is inaccessible to the common person. Julien says, 
"No money means no access. If you don't have work, you don't have money to pay an 
attorney."69 
Haiti has no public defender program. The Haitian Bar Association has regulations in 
place for recent law school graduates to serve as legal counsel to the poor,70 L'Amicale des 
Juristes trains paralegals to serve in the countryside, and many lawyers provide free legal 
assistance to the poor, but these organizations and individuals are not able to provide legal 
representation for the vast number of needy clients. The lack of money to pay for legal 
services, combined with the unwillingness of many lawyers to practice criminal law, results 
in many criminal defendants being convicted and imprisoned without ever consulting with an 
attorney.71 
F. Disorganization 
In the Haitian justice sector, chaos is the norm. Upon taking office, former Minister 
of Justice Malbranche decided to write all judges a memo to tell them to be on time for work. 
Malbranche was unable to send the memo because he did not know how many judges Haiti 
had and did not have an accurate listing of where the judges could be reached.72 
Several attorneys mentioned the lack of a judicial calendar as a prime example of the 
disorganization that plagues the Haitian justice sector. When a case is filed with the court, a 
judge is assigned to the case, but the judge never schedules a specific date to hear the case. 
The attorney must appear in court and wait long hours before the judge calls the case. Even 
when the judge decides to adjudicate a claim, many times there will be additional delays if one 
of the required parties is absent 7 3 
According to lawyer Chantai Ewald Hudicourt, the only thing that works efficiently in 
the Haitian court system is the person who types the final judicial order, because this person 
is paid per case typed.7 4 
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Others contend that the court structure breeds chaos. The Investigating Judge and the 
Prosecutor share responsibility for investigating crimes and this joint responsibility adds to the 
chaos of the system, causing abdication of responsibility. Essentially, the Investigating Judge 
assumes that the Prosecutor is investigating a case, but in reality neither side takes the initiative 
to investigate crimes thoroughly.75 
G. 1987 Constitution Criticized 
Many members of the legal community in Haiti voiced criticism of the 1987 
Constitution. According to the president of L'Amicale, the Constitution was "[B]orn of 
passion, bom of emotion, but never applied." Julien contends that the laws found in the 1987 
Constitution are mere words because "People did not have the courage to apply the laws of the 
Constitution."76 
The Port-au-Prince Bar Association President sees the 1987 Constitution as being 
unclear and unenforceable. Rigauld Duplan points out that the 1987 Constitution provides for 
one "Provisional Council" to monitor the first round of elections, and then requires that a 
permanent council be established to monitor all subsequent elections. A provisional council 
guided the 1990 elections, and according to the 1987 Constitution, a permanent council should 
have been established for the upcoming elections. A second provisional council is being 
formed for the current election rather than a permanent council, and Duplan considers this 
unconstitutional. 
American commentators have categorized the 1987 Constitution as an aspirational 
document rather than as a realistic legal guide for Haiti. These commentators point to 
provisions that guarantee classroom facilities for elementary school students and paid annual 
vacations for every worker as evidence of the aspirational nature of the document.77 
H. Inadequate Law Enforcement 
Historically, the Haitian military and police have served as a repressive force rather than 
as enforcers of the law. When Aristide returned in October 1994, many members of the police 
force deserted their positions, and the US military reported that the Haitian police force had 
"virtually disappeared."71 
Law enforcement in Haiti is being provided by the Multi-National Force (MNF) and 
an interim force of Haitian police. The MNF and a Haitian official make all arrests jointly. 
According to US forces stationed at the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, the MNF acts 
independently of the Haitian police only when a crime takes place in its presence. 
The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a US 
Justice Department agency, has trained an interim force of poüce. The US-sponsored program 
trained former members of the Haitian Armed Forces in a six-day course to provide temporary 
law enforcement.79 
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Human and legal rights advocates criticize the interim police force because it is 
composed of the former military and police. Some human rights organizations question 
whether an individual can be retrained to provide law enforcement if he has worked for years 
as a member of a repressive military regime. 
Supporters of the ICITAP program say human rights abusers were eliminated from the 
interim police force through a vetting process. The candidate list was checked against the 
Aristide government's records of human rights abusers and the OAS/UN Civilian Mission 
records of human rights offenders. In addition, the State Department's International Narcotics 
Matters Bureau reviewed the interim police force candidate list. 
Critics of the vetting process point to the fact that no Haitian human rights organizations 
were allowed to participate in the vetting process, and after the United Nations and the Aristide 
government turned over their records, no other outside groups had contact with the vetting 
process. 
Others point to the low number of candidates who were eliminated from the list as 
evidence that the process was ineffective. At the end of November, out of the thirteen hundred 
and fifty soldiers and officers whose records were examined by the vetting committee, only 
about a hundred and fifty were excluded.80 
A permanent force of police, selected from the general public, began an ICITAP-
sponsored training program in February. Lawyers interviewed expressed the hope that this new 
force of police would serve as Haiti's first professional law enforcement body, but some worry 
that the new force will serve as a repressive regime. One lawyer said, "[T]he new police force 
will be successful if they have respect for their job and if the public has respect for them/ 1 8 1 
I. Lack of Infrastructure and Basic Equipment 
There was a jail break last month. Close to 106 inmates escaped, but 
people living around the prison helped catch the inmates. 
(US Military Guard at the National Penitentiary) 
The lack of structure and basic equipment is a problem that plagues the justice sector. 
Inadequate courthouses and insecure prisons are the norm. Courts lack basic materials such 
as typewriters and file cabinets, and most courts do not even have the basic legal texts. Many 
courts are without electricity or running water. 
The US government has focused on providing basic equipment and legal texts, but has 
no immediate plans to assist in the construction of either courthouses or prisons. Two 
lieutenants from the US Army Civil Affairs Brigade conducted a survey of the prisons in Haiti 
and provided USAID with an overview of the status of the prison system. USAID has 
requested that the Department of Defense continue assessment of the prisons and has discussed 
a possible role for the International Red Cross in estimating the cost of prison construction. 
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J. Multinational Forces Aligned with Former Human Rights Abusers 
Acting under the authorization of United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, 
multinational forces began arriving in Haiti on September 19, 1994, with the directive of using 
all necessary means to ensure the departure of military leadership and to establish and maintain 
a secure and stable environment 1 2 The multinational force was replaced on March 31, 1995, 
by the United Nations Mission in Haiti, comprised of military personnel from 34 nations 
(UNMIH). This contingent is responsible for sustaining a secure and stable environment.83 
Some organizations have been critical of the MNF/UNMIH strategy for establishing a 
secure and stable environment The Lawyers Committee For Human Rights contends that 
when the international forces work with members of the "old regime," the development of a 
strong justice sector is impeded. Typically, the primary contact with a community is with 
former military officials or a wealthy, English-speaking landowner. The local powerholders 
are able to communicate the message, T m here for Democracy." With this easy and 
understandable pledge, the international forces do not take additional steps to ensure that a safe 
environment exists. According to one source, "Many residents of Jérémie (a town in southwest 
Haiti) feel that the international forces are protecting these abusers and allowing them to 
continue to terrorize the town."14 
The Haitian media reports many examples of the international forces working with the 
former military regime. On November 4, 1993, not far from the city of Jacmel, US troops and 
Haitian soldiers reinstalled the local section chief, despite the fact that the section chief position 
had officially ended October 31 of that year. 
K. "Street Justice" 
Given the status of die Haitian justice system, it is not hard to understand why the 
average person would have little respect for the value of written law or a modem court system. 
This lack of respect for the established court system and written law results in members 
of society taking justice into their own hands. For example, when a thief is caught stealing in 
the market, he is not turned over to the police and sent to jail - he is killed. 
To the average Westerner, this style of punishment seems harsh. But in a system where 
there has never been a reliable police force to make arrests, never been a neutral magistrate to 
evaluate guilt or innocence, and never been a reliable prison system to punish and rehabilitate, 
the law of vengeance reigns supreme. 
Much in the same way that the accused thief is tried in the street because there is no 
functioning justice sector, many people fear that if there is no formal tribunal to adjudicate 
claims against human rights abusers, the "street justice" tribunal that has tried the small-time 
thief will also be used to try and punish human rights offenders. 
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The term dechoukaj is commonly associated with the vengeance-based justice system 
in Haiti. The literal translation of dechoukaj means to rip a weed out of the ground so it will 
not grow back. In the socio-political context, dechoukaj signifies uprooting the members of 
a fallen regime. 
This tradition of violent uprooting can be traced back to when Haiti gained 
independence from France. Haiti's first leader, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, used the motto, "Cut 
Heads, Burn Houses" as a guide for the Haitian slaves who united to uproot French colonists. 
A violent uprooting was used after the fall of Duvalier when the Tonton Macoutes, Duvalier's 
private army, were burned in the streets at the hands of those whom they had repressed.85 
Many people believe that the only way to avert violence against former powerholders 
is to establish a truth commission. Truth Commissions were organized in El Salvador during 
the transition from dictatorship to democracy in order to bring to light the abuses of the 
military regime. 
In theory, if tibe avenge citizen believes he can find justice through a truth commission, 
there will be less of a desire to tura to "street justice." Theorists who have studied the use of 
truth commissions in other countries contend that such a mechanism provides the people with 
confidence that a system exists to punish those who break the law, and when the average 
citizen sees that everyone is subject to written laws, there will be increased respect for the 
justice system.1 6 
Diane F. Orentlicher, the General Counsel for the International League for Human 
Rights, contends that by punishing the evildoers from prior military regimes, a country is able 
to strengthen the justice sector and die democratic institutions of the new regime. Orentlicher 
explains that these prosecutions help end the cycle of state violence by sending a message to 
the current administration that they will be held responsible for their actions.87 
Critics say that as long as there is a continued threat of violence from the former 
military and still active paramilitary organizations, a truth commission will not be effective. 
According to Necker Dessables of the National Commission for Justice and Peace, "There can 
be no truth commission if there is fear..., if there is no disarmament, then people are scared to 
go for justice." 1 1 
On December 20, 1994, Aristide named Françoise Boucard to head a seven-member 
truth commission, but it has not been determined if the perpetrators of violence will still be 
subject to criminal and civil prosecution.99 
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III. CONCLUSION 
It's not just the President of the Supreme Court who is deaf..., it is the 
whole justice system. 
(One observer's statement after pointing to the 
hearing aid of the President of the Supreme Court.) 
"The President of the Supreme Court is getting a Miracle Ear." 
(Port-au-Prince lawyer Gary Lissade) 
Many people in the legal community believe the justice sector is irreparably broken and 
use the Haitian proverb, "Behind mountains, there are more mountains," to explain the 
desperate situation. Lawyers talk of corrupt and incompetent judges. Law professors point to 
the dilapidated law school. Law students mention there is no public law library. Judges point 
to the lack of respect for law among the general public. Legal rights associations highlight that 
the court system is inaccessible. Legal rights advocates and human rights groups worry that 
the high level of weapons will continue to intimidate all members of the justice sector. 
Many in the international community take one look at these problems and turn their 
eyes away. They say, "It is not our mission to rebuild the Haitian justice system. They have 
a constitution. They have a penal code. They have a bar... It's up to Haiti now."90 Other 
people say, "Haiti is not ready for democracy." These people see the obstacles blocking 
democracy and justice sector reform and say that they are impossible to overcome. 
Although some people believe the Haitian proverb "Behind mountains, there are 
mountains" captures the essence of the Haitian justice sector as it stands today, those more 
hopeful point to another Haitian proverb, "Men anpil, chay pa loun ("Many hands, the load is 
not heavy"). These people see the same problems, but hold the belief that with many people 
working together, it will be possible to build a system in which the rule of law prevails. 
A strong justice sector will not be achieved overnight, but this is a crucial time to begin 
building institutions that will help Haiti move from a "Gwo Nèg" injustice system to one in 
which written law rules. In much the same way that countries formerly under communist rule 
are currently making a transition to a system governed by laws rather than dictators, Haiti too 
can begin this transition. Possibly with the lack of a "Gwo Nèg" in the community, Haiti can 
move to a system in which the rule of law is established. 
The pessimists are in some ways correct when they say it is impossible to "build" a 
justice system for Haiti. The international forces can help establish a safe environment, 
USAID can help develop judge-training programs, and non-governmental organizations can 
donate legal texts and basic supplies, but they cannot "build" a legal institution. It is up to 
Haitians to break from the "Gwo Nèg" system and to develop a tradition based on written law. 
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I had the opportunity to meet many members of the Haitian legal community, both 
conservative thinkers and radical advocates, who want to bring a tradition of law to Haiti. 
With many nations focusing on Haiti and with the desire of the vast majority of Haitians to 
build a true democracy, together Haiti can build a system that can truly be called just. 
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